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Abstract In this paper I document that highway
construction firms in California, particularly those
owned by blacks and Asians, exhibit considerable
racial segregation in that they are disproportionately
located in zip codes with the greatest concentration of
own-race residents. I find that segregated firms serve
a larger market than minority-owned firms that are
not segregated and that this effect is concentrated in
black-owned firms. I next exploit the segregation of
firms to examine the effect of affirmative action on
the success of minority-owned firms. Following the
significant curtailment of affirmative action in Cali-
fornia due to a direct statewide ballot initiative, the
number of highway construction establishments
located in zip codes with the highest concentrations
of black and Asian residents fell relative to the rest of
the state, even conditional on the number of non-
construction establishments. This suggests that affir-
mative action policies may play a role in the net
survival rates of minority-owned firms.
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Segregation along racial lines is a common feature of
the organization of cities, and this pattern of racial
segregation tends to be highly correlated with the
location of economic disadvantage within a city. As a
consequence, racial segregation has been an important
area of study for those trying to understand racial gaps
in measures of economic well-being. Much of the
focus has centered on the location of employment
within a city in relation to the location of racial and
ethnic enclaves. The so-called spatial mismatch
hypothesis, first advanced by Kain (1968), suggests
that minority unemployment may in part be due to
geographic patterns of employment and residence,
where minorities are segregated into central cities
while employment opportunities are concentrated in
suburbs.1 Encouraging business ownership among
minorities, potentially through affirmative action
programs, may help alleviate this problem if minor-
ity-owned firms locate near minority population
centers. Establishing the impact of affirmative action
on minority firms is an important part of the current
policy debate due to the recent curtailment of affir-
mative action programs through the courts and voter
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1 Holzer (1991) provides a literature review on the spatial
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and Zenou (2003).
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initiatives and due to the potential cost of these
programs (Marion forthcoming b).
In this paper, I investigate the location of minority-
owned firms in the highway construction industry and
how affirmative action may affect the success of firms
located in neighborhoods with the highest concentra-
tions of minority residents. Highway construction and
repair is an important public procurement market that
makes intensive use of affirmative action programs.
In 1998, states awarded US$14.6 billion of construc-
tion and repair contracts using federal funds, of which
US$1.9 billion was awarded to firms owned by
minorities and women. In addition, most states and
many counties and cities also use affirmative action
to direct locally funded projects to firms owned by
minorities and women.
I first utilize the directory of disadvantaged
business enterprises (DBEs) that are pre-qualified to
perform work on California Department of Transpor-
tation (Caltrans) road construction and repair pro-
jects. I find that the location of firms in this industry
closely corresponds to patterns of residential location
by race—black-owned firms are disproportionately
likely to locate in zip codes with higher concentra-
tions of black residents, Hispanic-owned firms are
disproportionately likely to locate in Hispanic areas,
and so forth.2 I will refer to this pattern as firm
segregation.3
The extent to which this segregation affects the
success of firms owned by minorities is an important
question.4 By locating in minority areas, firms may
limit their access to capital and to prime contractors.
On the other hand, own-race networks may be
positive factors in firm success. Firms may face
discrimination in terms of obtaining business, leasing
land, and forming networks in predominantly white
neighborhoods. Furthermore, common cultural ties
can make enforcing informal contracts easier.5
To investigate this question, I examine the breadth
of a firm’s capabilities as measured by the number of
districts in which the firm is prequalified to perform
work. I find that black- and Hispanic-owned firms are
able to serve smaller areas than Asian- and white-
owned firms. Interestingly, segregated minority-
owned firms, those located in zip codes with high
own-race population concentrations, are able to serve
larger markets than non-segregated firms. Further-
more, the effect of segregation on firms’ market size
is uneven among races. Segregated black-owned
firms experience a significantly positive segregation
effect, while segregation has a much smaller and
statistically insignificant effect on the capabilities of
firms owned by Hispanics and Asians. Since firm
location is an endogenous variable, this may explain
why black firms experience a greater degree of
segregation.
Having established that minority-owned firms do
tend to locate in areas with a greater composition of
minority residents, this paper lastly examines the
effect of affirmative action on firms in minority
areas.6 I use the implementation of California’s
Proposition 209, which eliminated the consideration
of race and gender in the awarding of state contracts,
to provide evidence on the effect of affirmative action
on minority businesses and economic activity in
minority neighborhoods. I focus in particular on
highway construction establishments, as firms in this
industry derive most of their revenue from public
projects and are, therefore, the most subject to
policies in public procurement. Using data from the
2 The zip code may not be the ideal level of geography to
evaluate racial segregation since its boundaries may match
poorly with those of racial neighborhoods. However, I prefer
this level of geography here since the findings related to firm
segregation will aid in the interpretation of the results where I
examine establishment counts at the zip code level.
3 While I will use the term segregation to describe the location
of firms in own-race neighborhoods, the evidence I will present
suggests that firms locate in areas that are only disproportion-
ately comprised of own-race residents. For instance, black-
owned firms are far more likely to locate in areas where at least
20% of the population is black than are other firms. However,
more than half of black-owned firms locate in zip codes where
less than 20% of the population is black.
4 For a detailed discussion of factors affecting the success of
black-owned businesses, see Fairlie and Robb (2007).
5 For instance, Gil and Hartmann (2007) examine dry cleaners
located in Los Angeles’ Koreatown, finding that drycleaners
with Korean-speaking owners are less likely to be vertically
integrated. This suggests that the costs of using the market are
lower for firms with access to the social network. Other papers
that consider the importance of social networks for business
formation and success include those of Davidsson and Honig
(2003), Kalnins and Chung (2005), Rauch (2001), and Shane
and Cable (2002).
6 In a related paper, Bollinger and Ihlanfeldt (2003) examine
the effect of various government interventions on the pattern of
employment within a city.
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Zip Code Business Patterns, I find that the initiative’s
implementation coincided with a decline of 2.6 and
2.1% in the likelihood of zip codes in the fifth
quintile of the black and Asian population distribu-
tion, respectively, having a highway construction
establishment. I find that zip codes in the fifth quintile
of the Hispanic distribution, in contrast, saw an
increase in the likelihood of having an establishment.
The racial location of Hispanic-owned firms is more
evenly spread across the Hispanic population distri-
bution, which may help explain this finding.
Highway procurement is a useful setting for
examining affirmative action for several reasons.
First, the use of affirmative action is widespread in
this setting. Since the late 1970s and early 1980s,
most states have employed affirmative action to
award contracts to minority-owned firms. Second,
affirmative action programs in highway procurement
are in general comparable across states. Most states
use percentage goals for the participation of minority-
owned subcontractors by prime contractors. This
allows for comparison across states and furthermore
allows one to more readily generalize results obtained
from a particular state to other states. Finally, the
highway construction industry is mostly comprised of
firms selling to the government. According to the
2002 Census of Industries, 72.6% of the construction
work performed by firms in the highway, street, and
bridge construction industry was for government-
owned projects. As a result, changes in public
procurement policy will have a strong effect on firms
in the highway construction industry. This fact eases
the burden placed on the data, as drawing inference
regarding the effect of affirmative action on a given
firm in the highway construction industry will
provide more power than making the same inference
regarding a firm in the broader construction industry.
While affirmative action has been found to
increase the utilization of minority-owned firms in
procurement (for example, Marion forthcoming a), its
effects on business success and firm formation and
survival have proven difficult to assess. Bates and
Williams (1996) examine data from the Characteris-
tics of Business Owners, utilizing a question in this
survey that asks responding firms the revenues they
derive from selling to the government. These
researchers find that minority business owners who
rely heavily on government contracts were more
likely to fail between 1987 and 1991. Blanchflower
and Wainwright (2005) utilize data from the Current
Population Survey to examine whether self-employ-
ment rates among minorities and women were lower
after federal affirmative action programs were weak-
ened by the case of City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson
Co. In this case, the Supreme Court ruled that race-
conscious programs must meet strict scrutiny require-
ments establishing a compelling need for the program
and that the program is narrowly tailored. Blanch-
flower and Wainwright (2005) find that self-employ-
ment rates among minorities and women were not
significantly different post-Croson, despite the fact
that many local affirmative action programs ended
during this time. Chatterji et al. (2009) examine
cities’ adoption of affirmative action programs in
procurement, finding that black self-employment
rates rose dramatically in adopting cities. In contrast,
Fairlie and Marion (2008) find that eliminating
affirmative action in California and Washington was
in fact associated with an increase in minority self-
employment rates in those states, possibly due to
those same affirmative action programs also applying
to labor markets, so their elimination may have
lowered the opportunity cost to business formation.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides
background information on highway procurement in
California and Caltrans’ affirmative action program.
Section 3 describes the data that will be used; Sect. 4
presents the results, and Sect. 5 concludes.
2 Background
Until March of 1998, the California Department of
Transportation (Caltrans) set a statewide goal for the
participation of DBEs on state highway construction,
which it met by applying a DBE subcontractor
participation goal on a project-by-project basis. To
qualify as a DBE, a firm must meet two requirements:
an ownership requirement that at least 51% of a
business must be owned by the group for which the
goal applies, and an operations requirement that the
minority or female owners be involved in the day-to-
day operation of the business.
Firms bidding for construction contracts must
supply a list of the subcontractors to be used in the
completion of the project. A qualifying bid either
meets the participation goal stipulated in the contract
or documents a good faith effort to locate DBEs in
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the event that the participation goal is not met. Bids
are often rejected for failing one of these two tests.
From May 1996 until the end of 2002, 36 low bids
were rejected on this basis.
In June 1996, voters in California passed a
statewide referendum, Proposition 209, which was
intended to eliminate the consideration of race and
gender in state contracting, education, and employ-
ment. This ballot initiative affected projects using
only state funds. The application of Proposition 209
to many state programs was delayed because the
California constitution states that local agencies will
continue to enforce state statutes until they are
repealed by the legislature or ruled unconstitutional
by the courts. There also remained ambiguities
regarding which programs Proposition 209 actually
covered. A federal appeals court in 1997 upheld
Proposition 209, but participation goals continued to
be used by Caltrans throughout 1997 and into 1998.
Two relevant legal decisions were delivered in early
1998, Hi-Voltage Wire Works v. City of San Jose and
Monterey Mechanical v. Wilson, both coming down
against the use of participation goals in contracting.
Following these court rulings, in March of 1998
California Governor Pete Wilson issued an executive
order stating that all state programs utilizing gender-
and race-based participation goals in the awarding of
state contracts were to be immediately suspended.
The executive order affected only contracts funded
entirely by the state, since eliminating affirmative
action would potentially place funding from federal
sources in jeopardy. Because approximately half of
the road construction contracts awarded by the state
used federal funds (Marion forthcoming b), Proposi-
tion 209 did not fully eliminate affirmative action in
California; however, it significantly curtailed its use
after 1998. At other levels of government, the last
court decisions to rule against race-conscious affir-
mative action were decided in 2004.
3 Data
3.1 Caltrans disadvantaged business enterprise
directory
Information regarding firms in this market is obtained
from the DBE directory maintained by Caltrans. Based
on capabilities, firms can gain pre-qualification to
perform work on certain types of projects and certain
locations. This directory contains information on all
firms qualified to be counted as DBEs fulfilling the
DBE subcontracting requirement in a contract. It also
contains information on the firm’s location, the work it
is willing to perform, and the race of the owner. I
exclude firms located outside California from analysis.
3.2 Zip code business patterns
The zip code business patterns data provide the
number of establishments at the five digit zip code
level. Establishments simply represent the unique
geographic locations of firms, and several establish-
ments can be owned by the same firm. These data
provide the number of establishments at a detailed
level of industry, which will in turn be used to identify
the number of establishments specifically in the
highway construction industry in a particular zip code.
The data used in this paper are yearly information from
1994 to 2002, spanning the implementation of Prop-
osition 209. A significant reclassification of industries
occurred in 1997, when the Census transitioned from
using Standard Industry Classification (SIC) codes to
using North American Industry Classification System
(NAICS) codes. The primary industry I focus on is
Highway and Street Construction Contractors,
Excluding Elevated Highways, SIC 1611/NAICS
234110, an industry providing a virtually perfect
match between the two industry taxonomies. I also
examine the construction industry more generally,
which includes SIC 15/16/17 and NAICS 23. The
correspondence between the two classifications is less
precise here, with the discrepancies between the two
due largely to NAICS including establishments spe-
cializing in management services within the construc-
tion industry. However, according to the bridge
between the SIC and NAICS provided by the Census,
98% of establishments in NAICS 23 are in the SIC
construction category, and NAICS 23 includes all
establishments from the SIC construction category.
4 Results
4.1 Firm segregation
I begin by documenting the degree to which highway
construction firms are geographically segregated
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along racial lines. Table 1 provides the distribution of
firms over the racial concentration of zip codes. For
example, in the top panel, I display the number of
black-, Hispanic-, Asian-, and white-owned firms by
the fraction of the zip code population that is black.
The firms in the Caltrans DBE directory are relatively
balanced across racial groups. Of the 1641 firms in
the directory, 311 are black-owned, 480 are owned by
Hispanics, 395 are owned by Asians, and 455 are
owned by white females. Despite this balance, black
firms are disproportionately located in zip codes with
the highest proportion of black residents. Of the 23
firms located in zip codes where at least 60% of the
population is black, 21 are black-owned. Further-
more, while only 10% of firms not owned by blacks
are located in zip codes with at least a 20% black
population, 48% of black-owned firms are located in
these zip codes.
While black-owned firms seem to be the most
highly segregated, a similar though less pronounced
pattern emerges for Asian-owned firms. Asian-owned
firms account for 24% of the firms in the directory,
yet account for 55% of the 67 firms located in zip
codes with a population that is at least 40% Asian.
Hispanic-owned firms are less segregated by race,
though some segregation is still noticeable. These
firms account for 29% of the 1641 firms in the
directory, yet account for 54% of firms in zip codes
with a population at least 60% Hispanic.
Each of the cells in Fig. 1 has a different number
of zip codes, making a comparison across population
concentrations of different races difficult. For
instance, far more zip codes have a black population
share of less than 20% than have a Hispanic
population share of less than 20%. To directly
account for this, I next divide zip codes into quintiles
of their black population share, Hispanic population
share, and Asian population share. I then plot the
distribution of black-, Hispanic-, and Asian-owned
firms across these quintiles. The advantage of this
comparison is that the fifth quintile of zip codes based
on black population share has the same number of zip
codes as the fifth quintile of zip codes based on
Hispanic population share.
The results of this exercise are plotted in Fig. 1. In
Panel A, I consider how black-, Hispanic, and Asian-
owned firms are distributed across zip codes accord-
ing to the percentage of the zip code population that
is black. White, Hispanic, and Asian firms are
distributed similarly across the black population,
with more of these firms located in the third, fourth,
and fifth quintiles of the black population. Thirty-
three percent of white firms locate in zip codes in the
highest quintile of black population zip codes,
compared with 34% of Hispanic firms and 40% of
Asian firms. However, black-owned firms over-
whelmingly locate in black zip codes, as 72% of
black-owned firms locate in zip codes in the fifth
quintile of the black population distribution.
Panel B displays results from a similar exercise,
where the distribution of firms is shown across the
quintiles of zip codes’ Hispanic population percent-
age. The results are far less striking than for the
segregation of black-owned firms. Considering the
highest quintile zip codes of Hispanic population,
32% of Hispanic firms locate there compared with
17% of Asian-owned firms and 18% of white-owned
firms.
As with Black- and Hispanic-owned firms, Asian-
owned firms exhibit a considerable degree of segre-
gation. Panel C plots the distribution of firms across
quintiles of the Asian population. Sixty percent of
Asian-owned firms are located in the highest quintile
of the Asian population. This compares with 32% of
Hispanic firms and 43% of black firms.
4.2 Segregation and firm capabilities
I next examine how the segregation documented in
Sect. 4.1 correlates with firm capabilities. Segrega-
tion may limit the business networks of minority
firms, which may affect access to capital and business
markets. On the other hand, locating near suppliers or
contractors that share common cultural links may
enhance firm performance.
I consider the number of Caltrans districts in
which firms are qualified to work. Figure 2 provides a
map of these districts. There are 12 districts in the
state, and each district is of considerable size, with
the exception of district 12, which is comprised
entirely of Orange County. Conditional on the type of
work the firm performs, market scope is a strong
indication of the firm’s breadth of capabilities. First,
districts are large enough that a firm serving a
separate district implies a firm with a sizable market,
not merely a firm that must look outside of its
immediate zip code to find work. Second, distance is
an important element of the highway construction
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market. Firms located far from a construction work
site tend to bid higher than firms located close by, and
distance is an important element in the market entry
decision.
The goal of this section is to estimate the effect of
segregation on the number of districts a firm is
qualified to serve. A segregated firm is defined as one
located in a zip code that is in the fifth quintile of the
Table 1 Caltrans DBE firm location by racial composition of zip code
\20% 20–40% 40–60% 60–80% [80% Number of firms






































































































































































































Caltrans, California Department of Transportation; DBE, disadvantaged business enterprises
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own-race population distribution. The regression to
be estimated is








where si is an indicator for a firm being segregated,
and ri and q5i are a series of dummy variables
indicating the race of the firm and whether the firm’s
location is in the fifth quintile of the population
distribution of race k. Therefore, the variable si is an
interaction between the race indicator and the fifth
quintile indicator. I will include in this regression
only firms owned by white women and those owned
by black, Hispanic, and Asian men and women.7
The results are presented in Table 2. In column 1, I
consider a specification that only includes the set of
race indicators. Compared to firms owned by white
women, Hispanic-owned firms serve 0.7 fewer
districts, and black-owned firms serve 2.0 fewer
districts. Asian firms serve 0.2 fewer districts, though
this figure is statistically insignificant and small
compared to the average of 8.6 districts.
In column 2, I present a specification that includes
the segregation dummy variable, as well as indicators
for being located in the fifth quintile of the population
distribution of the different racial categories. We see
that firms located in zip codes with the highest
concentration of black residents serve 1.4 fewer
districts, although firms located in fifth quintile















































Fig. 1 Distribution of firms by race of owner and zip code race population quintile
7 The directory also has 96 firms owned by American Indians,
Portuguese, and Spanish. These firms are excluded due to the
small population of American Indians and since segregation is
Footnote 7 continued
difficult to evaluate and potentially less relevant for Portuguese
and Spanish individuals.
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Hispanic and Asian neighborhoods do not serve a
statistically significant different number of districts.
Segregation seems to be a positive factor in the
capabilities of minority-owned firms. Segregated
firms serve 1.1 more districts than non-segregated
firms.
In Column 3, I split the effect of segregation by
race, and we see that the effect of segregation is not
evenly spread across races. Black firms experience a
significantly positive affect of segregation, and this is
enough to overcome the smaller market size they see
on average. Consistent with the results shown in
Columns 1 and 2, the results shown in Column 3
suggest that black-owned firms are found to serve 2.4
fewer districts than their white-owned counterparts.
However, black-owned firms located in zip codes
with the highest share of black residents serve an
almost identical number of districts as white firms in
the same areas and serve 1.1 more districts than other
black-owned firms located in areas with lower
concentrations of black residents. Conversely, there
is no effect of segregation on firms owned by
Hispanics or Asians. Furthermore, while the specifi-
cation in column 2 suggests that Hispanic firms serve
smaller markets than white-owned firms, once the
effect of segregation is separately estimated by race, I
find no difference in geographic market size between
Hispanic- and white-owned firms.
It is possible that unobserved factors at the zip
code level influence firm size. In evaluating the
effects of segregation, much of this is captured by
comparing minority firms located in minority areas
with white-owned firms located in minority areas.
However, the estimated effect of segregation will still
be biased if the minority areas that minority-owned
firms locate in are different than the minority areas in
which white-owned firms locate. To account for this






specification shown in column 4. The results indicate
that the estimated effect of segregation for black-
owned firms is not due to differences in zip code
characteristics. Segregated black firms serve 2.1 more
districts than non-segregated black firms. Interest-
ingly, zip code effects are able to account for most of
the size differences of white-owned firms and non-
segregated black-owned firms. In the specification
presented in column 4, I include controls for the
firm’s primary category of work. Some types of work
may involve lower transportation costs, and these
controls will account for any differences in the
distribution of races across types of work. In this
specification, segregated black firms are still esti-
mated to experience a positive effect of locating in
black neighborhoods, although controlling for work
codes can account for one-third of the effect.
4.3 Affirmative action and the number
of establishments
In this section, I consider the effect of affirmative
action on the number of highway construction
establishments in minority neighborhoods. As we
saw in Sect. 4.1, firms tend to be segregated racially.
Therefore, understanding how affirmative action
affects the number of establishments may tell us
how it alters the survival and formation rates of
minority-owned firms. This question has proved to be
difficult to answer, as data rarely allow one to observe
Table 2 Firm segregation and breadth of capability
Number of qualified districts in which a firm is qualified to perform work































































Zip code effects X X
Work code dummies X
Observations 1860 1860 1860 1860 1860
R2 0.03 0.06 0.07 0.56 0.65
Standard errors corrected for clustering by zip code are given in parenthesis. The dependent variable is the number of districts in
which a firm is qualified to perform work
***, **, * Indicates significance at the 99%, 95%, and 90% levels, respectively
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both measures of firm success, the race of the owner,
and whether a firm is a government contractor.
Furthermore, obtaining exogenous changes in affir-
mative action is difficult.
I will use the Zip Code Business Patterns data to
examine how the number of highway construction
establishments located in areas with high minority
populations in California changed around the time of
the implementation of Proposition 209, which elim-
inated the consideration of race and gender in the
awarding of state contracts. As we saw above,
Proposition 209 was approved by voters in 1996;
however, it was not broadly implemented in public
procurement until an executive order by Governor
Wilson in early 1998. This Proposition represents
plausibly exogenous variation in the degree of
affirmative action in procurement.
One objective of examining changes in the number
of highway construction establishments in high-
minority areas is to indirectly measure how affirma-
tive action alters the net survival of minority-owned
firms. The highway construction industry is mostly
composed of firms selling to the government, as 72%
of revenues in this industry derive from public
sources according to the 2002 Census of Construc-
tion. By examining firms in this industry, I am almost
exclusively studying public contractors and, there-
fore, those firms most impacted by public procure-
ment policies, such as affirmative action. This
combined with the observed segregation of minority
firms indicate that changes in the number of highway
construction establishments in high minority areas
may, under certain circumstances, tell us a consider-
able amount about the effect of affirmative action on
the net survival rates of minority establishments.
Using the Zip Code Business Patterns data, the
measure of business outcomes I will use is the
number of establishments in the construction industry
and, more specifically, in the highway construction
industry, before and after affirmative action in
California procurement was significantly curtailed
in 1998. Firms in these industries are likely to sell to
the government, and the average minority-owned
firm in these industries will have been more strongly
affected by state affirmative action programs than
minority-owned firms in other industries. I will use
the timing of this policy change to identify the effect
of affirmative action on businesses located in minor-
ity areas.
Examining highway construction establishments in
high-minority areas may—under some circum-
stances—yield direct evidence of the effect of
affirmative action on minority firms. In the extreme
case, if predominantly black zip codes are comprised
entirely of black-owned firms, then any change in the
number of establishments in these zip codes repre-
sents a net change in black-owned establishments. In
the intermediate case, where firms in predominantly
black zip codes are merely more likely to be black-
owned, the main assumption that is required is that
white entrants are distributed geographically simi-
larly to white incumbents. The elimination of affir-
mative action reduces the demand from black-owned
firms and increases the demand from white-owned
firms, which may induce white entry and black exit.
If the white-owned firm enters the same zip code that
the black firm exits, then even if affirmative action
had an adverse effect on minority firm success, it
could not be detected by looking at the overall
number of establishments in a zip code, even if the
firms there are most often black-owned. It is therefore
necessary to assume that white entrants are distrib-
uted geographically similarly to white incumbents.
This is likely a reasonable assumption here, as
establishments are being measured at the zip code
level, yet the relevant market in the construction
industry is geographically much broader. Therefore,
even if minority exit leads to entry by a white firm,
the characteristics of the road construction industry
do not suggest that the firm will be induced to enter
the exact zip code where the exit occurred.
The empirical strategy is to compare the number of
construction establishments in high-minority zip
codes with that observed in other areas of the state.
This comparison can be done conditional on overall
business activity in the state, which picks up any
underlying shocks affecting high-minority areas. This
suggests a difference-in-difference (DD) specification
of the form
yit ¼ c0 þ c1I year  1998ð Þ  q5ki þ c2xit þ ut þ qi
þ tit ð2Þ
where yit measures either the log number of highway
construction establishments or the log number of
construction establishments. Since only 33% of zip
codes have highway construction establishments, one
specification will also consider a linear probability
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model where the dependent variable is an indicator
for having a construction establishment. The variable
I(year C1998) is an indicator for being in the post-
Proposition 209 period, and q5i is a dummy variable
indicating whether the zip code is in the fifth quintile
of the distribution of either blacks, Hispanics, or
Asians. The coefficient of interest is therefore c1,
which describes the difference in establishments
between high-minority and low-minority areas,
before and after the contraction in affirmative action.
Unobserved differences across zip codes are captured
in the zip code fixed effects, qi, which also captures
the direct effect of being in the fifth quintile of the
racial distribution. Common shocks affecting all
firms in a given time period are captured by the year
effects, ut.
Finally, in each specification I will also control for
the log number of non-construction establishments,
xit, located in zip code i. Zip codes may be hit by
year-to-year shocks that affect firm formation and
survival, and if these shocks differentially affect
minority neighborhoods and are correlated with the
implementation of Proposition 209, this will bias the
estimates of c1. By controlling for the number of non-
construction establishments, this specification cap-
tures unobserved factors affecting business formation
at the zip code level. Therefore, for any unobserved
variables to bias the estimated coefficients, they
would have to differentially affect construction
establishments specifically located in high-minority
zip codes. Controlling for non-construction establish-
ments could introduce bias if there are firms in the
non-construction sector who could also be adversely
affected by affirmative action. This bias is likely to be
small, since public procurement represents a small
portion of the non-construction sector and, further-
more, this effect will bias our estimates of c1 toward
zero and away from finding an effect.
Table 3 presents estimates of (Eq. 2). The spec-
ifications shown in Columns 1–3 separately estimate
(Eq. 2) for black, Hispanic, and Asian neighborhoods.
Since there may be overlap between the neighbor-
hoods, the specification shown in Column 4 considers
them simultaneously. In Panel A, results are pre-
sented where the log of the number of highway
construction establishments is the dependent variable.
After Proposition 209, zip codes in the fifth quintile
of the Black and Asian distribution experienced a
decline in the number of highway construction
establishments, though the estimate for Black zip
codes is insignificant. Hispanic zip codes experienced
an increase in highway construction establishments
post-Prop. 209. It is worth noting that Hispanic firms
were far less segregated in highly Hispanic neigh-
borhoods than firms of other races.
As one-third of zip codes have no highway
construction establishments, examining the log of
this variable may miss important variation on the
extensive margin. Panel B of Table 3 presents similar
DD specifications with an indicator for whether a zip
code has a highway construction establishment.8 A
similar pattern emerges. Fifth quintile black and
Asian zip codes are, respectively, 2.6 and 2.1% less
likely to have a highway construction establishment
post-Proposition 209 relative to other zip codes, and
these estimates are statistically significant. Fifth
quintile Hispanic zip codes are again slightly more
likely to have an establishment after Proposition 209;
however, this estimate is statistically insignificant.
The specifications shown in Panel C of Table 3
consider the change in construction establishments
more generally. It is important to consider these
establishments for two reasons. First, firms in the
construction industry, even those outside of road
construction, derive a substantial fraction of their
revenue from selling to the government. Blanchflow-
er and Wainwright (2005) indicate that 22% of
revenue in this industry can be attributed to govern-
ment sources. Second, firms within the construction
industry that do not sell to the government represent
potential entrants into the public procurement market,
perhaps more so than for other industries. For
instance, it may be relatively easy for a firm that
constructs buildings exclusively in the private sector
to begin constructing buildings for the government.
The results indicate that black zip codes see a decline
in the number of construction establishments of 3.5%
relative to other zip codes. Interestingly, in the
broader construction industry, fifth quintile Hispanic
zip codes in fact see a decline in the number of
construction establishments of 4.4% , which stands in
contrast to the experience of these zip codes in the
more specific highway construction industry. Fifth
8 Similar results are obtained if a probit is used rather than the
linear probability model.
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quintile Asian zip codes saw little change in the
number of establishments in the broader construction
industry.
Taken together, the results suggest that black
neighborhoods experienced a decline in the number
of establishments in industries likely to serve the
government, and there is evidence that Hispanic and
Asian neighborhoods may have been similarly
adversely affected. While Hispanic areas saw an
increase in highway construction establishments post-
Proposition 209, the broader construction industry
experienced a decline. It is also worth repeating that
Hispanic-owned firms appear to be less segregated
into Hispanic neighborhoods than firms of other
races, which may help explain the mixed results
obtained for these zip codes.
Table 3 Proposition 209 and the number of California establishments
Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4
Panel A: Log number of highway construction establishments




















Observations 4487 4487 4487 4487
R2 0.71 0.71 0.72 0.72
Panel B: Highway construction establishments C0




















Observations 13411 13411 13411 13411
R2 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70
Panel C: Log number of construction establishments




















Observations 13411 13411 13411 13411
R2 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98
***, **, * Indicates significance at the 99%, 95%, and 90% level respectively
Robust standard errors are given in parenthesis. Other controls include zip code fixed effects and year dummies. A black zip code is




This paper provides new evidence regarding the
segregation of firms across racial lines in the highway
construction industry. Minority-owned firms are more
likely to locate in zip codes with a high concentration
of minority residents. Furthermore, this segregation
appears to be a positive factor in the breadth of firm
capabilities, at least for black-owned firms. When
affirmative action is significantly curtailed in Cali-
fornia state procurement, we see evidence of a
decline in construction establishments, and in high-
way construction establishments more specifically, in
black neighborhoods. Furthermore, zip codes with
high Asian concentrations also see a decline in the
number of highway construction establishments.
However, the evidence is mixed regarding the effect
of Proposition 209 on the number of establishments
in Hispanic neighborhoods. This result suggests that
eliminating affirmative action may have an adverse
impact on either the net survival rates or the size of
minority-owned firms.
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